We propose a formal model for the privacy of user attributes in terms of differential privacy. In particular, we introduce a notion, called distribution privacy, as the differential privacy for probability distributions. Roughly, a local obfuscation mechanism with distribution privacy perturbs each single input so that the attacker cannot significantly gain any information on the probability distribution of inputs by observing an output of the mechanism. Then we show that existing local obfuscation mechanisms have a limited effect on distribution privacy. For instance, we prove that, to provide distribution privacy w.r.t. the approximate max-divergence (resp. f-divergence), the amount of noise added by the Laplace mechanism should be proportional to the infinite Wasserstein (resp. the Earth mover's) distance between the two distributions we want to make indistinguishable. To provide a stronger level of distribution privacy, we introduce an obfuscation mechanism, called the tupling mechanism, that perturbs a given input and adds random dummy data. Then we apply the tupling mechanism to the protection of user attributes in location based services, and demonstrate by experiments that the tupling mechanism outperforms the popular local (extended) differentially private mechanisms in terms of distribution privacy and utility. Finally, we discuss the relationships among utility, privacy, and the cost of adding dummy data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [1] , [2] is a quantitative notion of privacy that has been applied to a wide range of areas, including databases, geo-location, social network, and machine learning. The protection of differential privacy can be achieved by adding controlled noise to a given data that we wish to hide. In particular, previous studies have focused on local obfuscation mechanisms, namely, randomized algorithms that perturb each single "point" data (e.g., a geo-location point) by adding certain probabilistic noise before sending it out to a data collector. However, the obfuscation of a probability distribution of points (e.g., a distribution of locations of male/female users) still remains to be investigated in terms of differential privacy.
For example, a location-based service (LBS) collects each user's geo-location data to provide a service (e.g., navigation, resource-trucking, or recommendation), and has been widely studied in terms of the privacy of user location information. As This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17K12667, JP16K16069, and by JSPS and Inria under the project LOGIS of the Japan-France AYAME Program.
shown in previous work [3] , [4] , users can hide their accurate locations by sending to the LBS provider only approximate location information calculated by an obfuscation mechanism.
Nevertheless, a user's location information can be used for an attacker to infer the user's attributes (e.g., age, gender, and residence area) or activities (e.g., working, sleeping, and shopping) [5] - [7] . For example, when an attacker knows the distribution of locations of the male/female users, then he may be able to detect whether given users are male or female after observing their locations. However, the protection of such attributes in terms of differential privacy has not been addressed in the literature. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, no local mechanisms have been studied on the capability of obfuscating a probability distribution (e.g., a distribution of locations of male/female users) in a differentially private manner.
To illustrate the privacy of user attributes in an LBS, let us consider a running example in which users try to prevent an attacker from inferring whether they are male or female. Let λ male and λ female be the probability distributions of locations of the male and female users, respectively. Then the privacy of this attribute can be modeled as a property that the attacker has no idea on whether the actual location follows the distribution λ male or λ female after observing an obfuscated location.
This can be formalized in terms of ε-local differential privacy as follows. For each t ∈ {male, female}, we denote by p(y | λ t ) the probability of observing an obfuscated location y when an actual location x is distributed over λ t . Then we define the privacy of t by:
which represents that the attacker cannot distinguish whether the users follow λ male or λ female (with degree of ε).
To generalize this, we introduce a notion, called distribution privacy (DistP), that is, the differential privacy for probability distributions. Roughly, a local obfuscation mechanism with distribution privacy perturbs each single input so that the attacker cannot significantly gain any information on the probability distribution of inputs by observing an output of the obfuscation mechanism. More specifically, we say that a mechanism A provides distribution privacy w.r.t. {λ male , λ female } if, by observing an obfuscated location (A's output), no attacker can detect whether the actual location (A's input) is sampled from λ male or λ female 1 . In this way, the privacy of attributes can be formalized using distribution privacy.
To achieve a stronger privacy of attributes, we introduce a mechanism, which we call the tupling mechanism, that not only perturbs an actual input, but also adds random dummy data to the output. Then we prove that the tupling mechanism provides distribution privacy. Moreover, we demonstrate by experiments that the tupling mechanism outperforms the popular mechanisms (the randomized response [8] , the planar Laplace mechanism [3] , and the planar Gaussian mechanism) in terms of distribution privacy and service quality, hence it is useful to protect the privacy of attributes.
Our contributions. The main contributions of this work are given as follows: • We present a formal model for the privacy of user attributes in terms of differential privacy. In particular, we introduce the notion of distribution privacy (DistP) to model the difficulty of obtaining information on probability distributions (representing user attributes) from an output observed by an attacker. • We investigate the theoretical foundation of distribution privacy. More specifically, we present useful properties of distribution privacy, including compositionality, and some relationships among variants of distribution privacy. We also give an interpretation of distribution privacy in terms of the Bayes factor. • We investigate existing obfuscation mechanisms that can provide distribution privacy. In particular, we show that (extended) differential privacy mechanisms need to add much noise to provide distribution privacy.
-We prove every (ε, δ)-differential privacy mechanism provides (ε, δ )-distribution privacy for some δ . -We show that an obfuscation mechanism with δ > 0 (e.g., the Gaussian mechanism) is not useful for distribution obfuscation when the domain is large. -We prove that every extended differential privacy mechanism (e.g., the Laplace mechanism) provides extended distribution privacy (XDistP) whose level is proportional to the ∞-Wasserstein distance W ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) between the two distributions λ 0 , λ 1 that we want to make indistinguishable. -We show that every f -divergence privacy (e.g. KLprivacy) mechanism contributes to distribution obfuscation proportionally to the Earth mover's distance (1-Wasserstein distance) W 1,d .
• We present an obfuscation mechanism, called the tupling mechanism, that adds random dummies to the output. Then we show how these dummies obfuscate the original input distribution (resp. input value) in terms of distribution privacy (resp. differential privacy).
• We apply the tupling mechanism to the protection of user attributes in location based services (LBSs), and evaluate it by experiments in the framework of distribution privacy. More precisely, we demonstrate by experiments how the tupling mechanism can obfuscate the distribution of actual user locations and make it more difficult to infer their attributes from their obfuscated location. Furthermore, we show that probabilistic dummy data improve each user's expected service quality loss (SQL) in the LBS. We also discuss the relationships among utility, privacy, and the cost of adding dummy data.
Paper organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some background on privacy and metrics used in this paper. Section III introduces a formal model for the privacy of user attributes, and proposes the notions of distribution privacy and its extensions. Section IV generalizes the distribution privacy notion w.r.t. an arbitrary divergence, and presents their useful properties, including compositionality and relationships among privacy notions. Section V shows how existing mechanisms contribute to the obfuscation of probability distributions. Sections VI proposes the tupling mechanism, and shows that this mechanism provides distribution privacy, hence differential privacy. Section VII applies the tupling mechanism to the protection of attribute privacy in LBSs, and evaluates it in terms of distribution privacy and service quality loss by experiments. Section VIII presents related work and Section IX concludes. All proofs of technical results can be found in Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we recall some notions of privacy and metrics used in this paper, including differential privacy, its variant notions, probability coupling, and the Wasserstein metrics.
Let N >0 (resp. N) be the set of positive (resp. non-negative) integers, and R >0 (resp. R ≥0 ) be the set of positive (resp. nonnegative) real numbers. Let [0, 1] be the set of non-negative real numbers not grater than 1. Throughout the paper, we assume ε, ε 0 , ε 1 ∈ R ≥0 and δ, δ 0 , δ 1 ∈ [0, 1].
A. Notations for Probability Distributions
We use the following notations in the paper. We denote by DX the set of all probability distributions over a set X , and by |X | the number of elements in a finite set X .
Given a finite set X and a probability distribution λ ∈ DX , the probability of drawing a value x from λ is denoted by
. Given a λ ∈ DX and a function f : X → R, the expected value of f over λ is defined by:
For a randomized algorithm A : X → DY and a set R ⊆ Y we denote by A(x)[R] the probability that given input x, A outputs one of the elements of R. Given a randomized algorithm A : X → DY and a probability distribution λ over X , we define A # (λ) as the distribution of the output y produced by Algorithm 1. Formally, for a finite set X , the
// Draw a value x from a given distribution λ y ← A(x) ; // Run A with an input x return y ;
B. Divergence
We first recall the notion of (approximate) max divergence, which is used to define differential privacy.
The max divergence is defined by:
Next we recall the notion of the f -divergences [9] . As shown in Table I , many divergence notions (e.g. Kullback-Leibler-divergence [10] ) are instances of f -divergence.
Definition 2 (f -divergence). Let F be the collection of functions defined by:
Let Y be a finite set, and µ, µ ∈ DY such that for every y ∈ Y, µ [y] = 0 implies µ[y] = 0. Then for an f ∈ F, the f -divergence of µ from µ is defined as:
We denote by Div(Y) the set of all divergences over Y.
C. Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential privacy [1] , [2] captures the idea that given two "adjacent" inputs x and x (from a set X of data with an adjacency relation Φ), a randomized algorithm A cannot distinguish x from x roughly (with degree of ε and up to some exceptions parameterized by δ).
Definition 3 (Differential privacy, DP). Let ε ∈ R ≥0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. A randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ)differential privacy (DP) w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ ⊆ X × X if for any two inputs (x, x ) ∈ Φ and for any R ⊆ Y,
where the probability is taken over the random choices in A.
Clearly the protection of differential privacy is stronger for smaller ε and δ. It is known that the above definition is equivalent to the following one using max-divergence.
Note that the sequential composition of differentially private mechanisms is differentially private: For any n independent randomized algorithms A 1 ,
D. Differential Privacy Mechanisms and Sensitivity
Differential privacy can be achieved by a privacy mechanism, namely a randomized algorithm that adds probabilistic noise to a given input that we want to protect. The amount of noise added by some popular mechanisms (e.g. the Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism) depends on a utility function u : X × Y → R that maps a pair of input and output to a utility score. More precisely, the noise is added according to the "sensitivity" of u, which we define as follows.
Definition 4 (Utility distance). Given a utility function u :
Note that d is a pseudometric. Hereafter we assume that for all x, y, u(x, y) = 0 is logically equivalent to x = y. Then the utility distance d is a metric.
Definition 5 (Sensitivity w.r.t. an adjacency relation). The sensitivity of a utility function u w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ ⊆ X × X is defined as:
For example, the exponential mechanism, defined below, perturbs the output according to the sensitivity ∆ Φ,d and provides ε-differential privacy w.r.t. Φ.
Example 1 (Exponential mechanism [11] ). Let ε ∈ R ≥0 . The exponential mechanism is the randomized algorithm E ε : X → DY that, given an input x, outputs y with the probability:
.
E. Extended Differential Privacy (XDP)
We review the notion of extended differential privacy [12] , which relaxes differential privacy by incorporating a metric d. Intuitively, this notion guarantees that when two input values x and x are closer in terms of d, then the output distributions are less distinguishable.
Definition 6 (Extended differential privacy, XDP). For a metric d : X × X → R, we say that a randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ, d)-extended differential privacy (XDP) if for all x, x ∈ X and for any R ⊆ Y,
Note that this notion can be seen as an extension of (ε, δ)-DP from an adjacency relation Φ to a metric d on inputs.
F. Probability Coupling
We recall the notion of probability coupling as follows.
Definition 7 (Coupling). Given two distributions λ 0 ∈ DX 0 and λ 1 ∈ DX 1 , a coupling of λ 0 and λ 1 is a distribution γ ∈ D(X 0 ×X 1 ) such that λ 0 and λ 1 are γ's marginal distributions, i.e., for each
We denote by cp(λ 0 , λ 1 ) the set of all couplings of λ 0 and λ 1 . 
G. Wasserstein Metric
We then recall the p-Wasserstein metric [13] between two distributions λ 0 and λ 1 , which is defined using a coupling γ of λ 0 and λ 1 as follows.
Definition 8 (p-Wasserstein metric). Let d be a metric over X , and p ∈ R ≥1 ∪ {∞}. The p-Wasserstein metric W p,d w.r.t. d is defined by: for any two distributions λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX ,
W 1,d is also called the Earth mover's distance.
The intuitive meaning of W 1,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) is the minimum cost of transportation from λ 0 to λ 1 in transportation theory. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , we regard each distribution λ b as the set of points where each point x has weight λ b [x], and we move some amount of weights in λ 0 from a point x 0 to another x 1 in order to construct λ 1 . We represent by γ[x 0 , x 1 ] the amount of weights moved from x 0 to x 1 . 2 We denote by d (x 0 , x 1 ) the cost (i.e., distance) of move from x 0 to x 1 . Then the minimum cost of the whole transportation is given by:
For instance, let us consider the coupling γ in Example 1. When the cost function d is the Euclid distance over X (e.g., d(2, 1) = |2 − 1| = 1), then the transportation γ achieves the minimum cost 0.1 · 1 + 0.2 · 1 = 0.3.
On the other hand, the ∞-Wasserstein metric W ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) represents the minimum largest move between points in a transportation from λ 0 to λ 1 . Specifically, in a transportation γ, max (x0,x1)∈supp(γ) d (x 0 , x 1 ) represents the largest move from a point in λ 0 to another in λ 1 . For instance, in the coupling γ in Example 1, the largest move is 1 (from λ 0 [2] to λ 1 [1] , and from λ 0 [2] to λ 1 [3] ). Such a largest move is minimized by a coupling that achieves the ∞-Wasserstein metric:
We denote by Γ p,d the set of all couplings that achieve the p-Wasserstein metric W p,d ; i.e.,
Then each γ ∈ Γ 1,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) can be computed by an efficient algorithm called North-West corner rule [14] when the function d is submodular, i.e., for all x 0 , x 0 , x 1 , x 1 ∈ X ,
H. Liftings of Relations
Finally, we recall the notion of the lifting of relations.
Definition 9 (Lifting of relations). Given a relation Φ ⊆ X × X , the lifting of Φ is the maximum relation Φ # ⊆ DX × DX such that for any (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # , there exists a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ 0 , λ 1 ) satisfying supp(γ) ⊆ Φ.
Note that by Definition 7, the coupling γ is a probability distribution over Φ whose marginal distributions are λ 0 and λ 1 .
Example 2 (Lifted relation). Let us consider the distributions λ 0 and λ 1 in Example 1. As shown in Fig. 1 , λ 0 can be transformed to λ 1 based on the coupling γ. Let us define an adjacency relation as Φ = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3)}. Then the coupling γ satisfies supp(γ) = Φ. By Definition 9, we obtain (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # , i.e., λ 0 is adjacent to λ 1 by the lifted relation Φ # . This means that we can construct λ 1 from λ 0 by moving some mass from λ 0 [x 0 ] to λ 1 [x 1 ] only for each (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ Φ (i.e., only when x 0 is adjacent to x 1 by Φ).
Then we restrict the lifting in Definition 9 to use only the couplings that achieve the p-Wasserstein metric W p .
Definition 10 (Lifting of relations for optimal transportation). Let p ∈ R ≥1 ∪{∞}. Given a relation Φ ⊆ X ×X , the lifting of Φ w.r.t. the p-Wasserstein metric W p is the maximum relation Φ # Wp ⊆ DX × DX such that for any (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # Wp , there exists a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ 0 , λ 1 ) satisfying supp(γ) ⊆ Φ and γ ∈ Γ p,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ).
By Definition 9, for any p, we have Φ # Wp ⊆ Φ # .
III. PRIVACY NOTIONS FOR PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section we introduce the privacy notion for user attributes (e.g., age and gender) and present its formal model. We first show a running example in which the privacy of user attributes is illustrated and modelled in terms of differential privacy. We then generalize this to the privacy notions for probability distributions, which we call distribution privacy. Intuitively, distribution privacy models the difficulty of inferring user attributes (represented by probability distributions) from the output observed by an attacker. In particular, we present three definitions that correspond to differential privacy (DP), its variants extended with a metric (XDP) and with probability (PDP), respectively. In Table II , we summarize the privacy notions and their abbreviations. Finally, we give an interpretation of distribution privacy in terms of Bayes factor.
A. Modeling the Privacy of User Attributes in Terms of DP As a running example, we consider an LBS (location based service) in which each user queries an LBS provider for a list of restaurants nearby. By observing a user's location, the LBS provider may be able to infer the user's attributes (e.g., age, gender, and residence area) and activities (e.g., working, sleeping, and shopping) [5]- [7] .
To hide a user's exact geo-location x from the provider, the user reveals only approximate information y on x to the provider [3] . More specifically, he applies a randomized algorithm A : X → DY, called a local obfuscation mechanism, to his location x, and obtains an approximate information y with the probability A(x) [y] . When A is the randomized response [8] (resp. the Laplace mechanism), it guarantees the protection of x in terms of differential privacy (resp. extended differential privacy). However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior work has investigated how an obfuscation mechanism A may or may not prevent the attacker (e.g., the LBS provider) from inferring user attributes by obfuscated locations.
To illustrate the privacy of user attributes, let us consider an example in which users try to prevent an attacker from inferring whether they are male or female by obfuscating their own exact locations using a mechanism A. For each attribute t ∈ {male, female}, let λ t ∈ DX be the prior distribution of the location of the users who have the attribute t. Intuitively, λ male (resp. λ female ) represent an attacker's belief on the location of the male (resp. female) users before the attacker observes an output of the mechanism A. Then the privacy of t can be modeled as a property that the attacker has no idea on DistP distribution privacy XDP extended differential privacy XDistP extended distribution privacy PDP probabilistic differential privacy PDistP probabilistic distribution privacy whether the actual location x follows the distribution λ male or λ female after observing an output y of A.
This can be formalized in terms of ε-local differential privacy. For each t ∈ {male, female}, we denote by p(y | λ t ) the probability of observing an obfuscated location y when an actual location x is distributed over λ t , i.e., p(y | λ t ) =
. Then we define the privacy of t by:
which represents that the attacker cannot distinguish whether the users follow λ male or λ female (with degree of ε). In Section III-F, we will present the case where an attacker has a different belief on λ male and λ female .
B. Distribution Privacy (DistP) and Point Privacy (PointP)
The privacy of user attributes presented in Section III-A can be generalized to the differential privacy for probability distributions. We define the notion of distribution privacy as the differential privacy in which the input is a probability distribution of data rather than a value of data. This notion models a level of obfuscation that hides which distribution a data value is drawn from. Intuitively, we say that a randomized algorithm A provides distribution privacy w.r.t. a set Λ of distributions if, by observing the output of A, we cannot detect from which distribution (among Λ) A receives an input value.
Definition 11 (Distribution privacy). Let ε ∈ R ≥0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Given an adjacency relation Ψ ⊆ DX × DX , we say that a randomized algorithm A : X → DY provides (ε, δ)distribution privacy (DistP) w.r.t. Ψ if its lifting A # : DX → DY provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy w.r.t. Ψ , i.e., for all pairs (λ, λ ) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have:
For example, the privacy of a user attribute t ∈ {male, female} described in Section III-A can be formalized as (ε, 0)distribution privacy w.r.t. {λ male , λ female }.
Note that distribution privacy is not a mathematically new notion but the differential privacy for distributions of data. To contrast with distribution privacy, we sometimes refer to the differential privacy for values of data as point privacy.
C. Extended Distribution Privacy (XDistP)
Next we introduce an extended form of distribution privacy to a metric. Intuitively, extended distribution privacy guarantees that when two input distributions are closer, then the output distributions must be less distinguishable.
Definition 12 (Extended distribution privacy). Let d : (DX × DX ) → R be a utility distance, and Ψ ⊆ DX × DX . We say that a function A : X → DY provides (ε, d, δ)extended distribution privacy (XDistP) w.r.t. Ψ if the lifting A # provides (ε, d, δ)-extended differential privacy w.r.t. Ψ , i.e., for all (λ, λ ) ∈ Ψ and all R ⊆ Y, we have:
D. Probabilistic Distribution Privacy (PDistP)
We next introduce an approximate notion of distribution privacy analogously to the notion of probabilistic differential privacy (PDP) [15] . Intuitively, a randomized algorithm provides (ε, δ)-probabilistic distribution privacy if it provides εdistribution privacy with probability at least (1 − δ).
Definition 13 (Probabilistic distribution privacy). Let Ψ ⊆ DX × DX . We say that a randomized algorithm A :
where the probability space is taken over the choices of randomness in A.
We show the formal statements and their proofs in Appendix E.
E. Interpretation by Bayes Factor
The interpretation of differential privacy has been explored in previous work [12] , [16] , [17] in particular using the notion of Bayes factor. Similarly, the meaning of distribution privacy can also be explained in terms of Bayes factor, which compares the attacker's prior and posterior beliefs as follows.
Assume that the attacker has some belief on the input distribution before observing the output values of an obfuscater A. We denote by Λ a set of probability distributions (that we wish to make indistinguishable), and by p(λ) the prior probability that a distribution λ is chosen from Λ as the input to the obfuscater A. By observing an output value y of A, the attacker updates his belief on the input distribution. We denote by p(λ|y) the posterior probability of a distribution λ being chosen (from Λ) given an output value y of A.
For two distributions λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ Λ, the Bayes factor K(λ 0 , λ 1 , y) is defined as the ratio of the two posteriors divided by that of the two priors: K(λ 0 , λ 1 , y) = p(λ0|y) p(λ1|y) p(λ0) p(λ1) . If the Bayes factor is far from 1 the attacker significantly updates his belief on the distribution by observing an output y of A.
Assume that A provides (ε, 0)-distribution privacy. By Bayes' theorem, we obtain:
Intuitively, if the attacker believes that λ 0 is k times more likely than λ 1 before the observation, then he believes that λ 0 is k · e ε times more likely than λ 1 after the observation. This means that for a small value of ε, distribution privacy guarantees that the attacker does not gain information on the distribution by observing the perturbed output y.
In the case of extended distribution privacy, the Bayes factor K(λ 0 , λ 1 , y) is bounded above by e εd(λ0,λ1) . Hence the attacker gains more information on the distribution for a larger value of the distance d(λ 0 , λ 1 ).
Finally, as for probabilistic distribution privacy, the Bayes factor K(λ 0 , λ 1 , y) is bounded above by e ε with probability at least 1 − δ. This means the attacker might gain information on the distribution with probability at most δ.
F. Privacy Guarantee for Attackers with Close Beleifs
In the previous sections, we assume that we know the actual input distributions to learn how much noise is sufficient for a mechanism to make the distributions indistinguishable in terms of distribution privacy. However, an attacker may have a different belief on the distributions, for example, more accurate distributions obtained by more observations. For each b = 0, 1, let λ b be the distribution that we use to determine the value of ε, and λ b be the distribution representing the attacker's belief.
When a mechanism A provides ε-DistP w.r.t. an adjacency relation Ψ and the attacker's beliefs are close enough to the user's, i.e., (λ 0 , λ 0 ), (λ 1 , λ 1 ) ∈ Ψ , then we obtain:
Similarly, when A provides (ε, d , 0)-XDistP, we have:
Therefore, when the attacker's beliefs are closer to ours, then a stronger distribution privacy is guaranteed.
IV. GENERALIZED DISTRIBUTION PRIVACY
In this section we generalize the definitions of distribution privacy and its extended form w.r.t. an arbitrary divergence D. Then we show their useful properties, including the compositionality and the relationships among privacy notions.
A. Variants of Differential Privacy
To generalize distribution privacy, we first present a generalized formulation of privacy notions including differential privacy, which is parameterized with a divergence D that determines the capability of distinguishing the output distributions.
Definition 14 (DP w.r.t. adjacency relation and divergence). For an ε ∈ R ≥0 , an adjacency relation Φ ⊆ X × X and a divergence D ∈ Div(Y), we say that a randomized algorithm
Note that (ε, D δ ∞ )-differential privacy is (ε, δ)-differential privacy. (ε, D f )-differential privacy is called ε-f -divergence privacy [18] , and (ε, D KL )-differential privacy (KLP) is called ε-KL-privacy [18] .
Next we generalize the notion of extended differential privacy (Definition 6) to an arbitrary divergence D.
Definition 15 (XDP w.r.t. divergence). Let d : X × X → R be a metric, Φ ⊆ X × X , and D ∈ Div(Y). We say that a randomized algorithm A :
B. Generalized Distribution Privacy
In this section we generalize the notion of (extended) distribution privacy to an arbitrary divergence D. The main aim of generalization is to present theoretical properties of distribution privacy in a more general form, and also to discuss distribution privacy based on the f -divergences.
Intuitively, we say that a randomized algorithm A provides (ε, D)-distribution privacy w.r.t. a set Ψ of pairs of distributions if for each pair (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Ψ , a divergence D cannot detect which distribution (of λ 0 and λ 1 ) is used to generate A's input value.
Next we introduce extended distribution privacy parameterized with a divergence D. Intuitively, extended distribution privacy with a divergence D guarantees that when two input distributions λ and λ are closer (in terms of a utility distance d), then the output distributions A # (λ) and A # (λ ) must be less distinguishable (in terms of a divergence D).
Definition 17 (XDistP generalized to a divergence). Let d : (DX × DX ) → R be a utility distance, D ∈ Div(Y), and Ψ ⊆ DX ×DX . We say that a randomized algorithm A :
Then (ε, d, D)-extended distribution privacy w.r.t. a set Λ ⊆ DX is defined analogously. 
C. Basic Properties of Distribution Privacy
In this section we show basic properties of (extended) distribution privacy and relationships among the privacy notions.
In Table III we summarize the results on two kinds of sequential compositions (Figure 2a ) and • (Figure 2b ), post-processing, and pre-processing for (extended) distribution privacy. (See Appendices C and D for the details.)
The compositionality of in Table III implies that when we apply an identical input value x (drawn from a distribution λ) to DistP mechanisms twice, then for a larger |Φ|, δ gets larger hence λ is harder to be obfuscated. In contrast, the compositionality of • implies that when two users respectively apply their independent inputs x b to mechanisms A b , then δ increases only linearly, hence λ can be obfuscated more effectively than the case of .
As for pre-processing, the stability notion is different from that for differential privacy: 
In Figure 3 we show the summary of the relationships among notions of extended differential privacy (XDP) and distribution privacy (DistP). One of the important properties is that differential privacy is an instance of distribution privacy, hence DistP (resp. XDistP) implies DP (resp. XDP). This implies that point obfuscation can be achieved by distribution obfuscation. See Appendices B and G for details.
We also obtain a relationship between probabilistic distribution privacy (PDistP) and D KL -distribution privacy. III: Summary of basic properties of (extended) distribution privacy.
Distribution privacy
Extended distribution privacy obfuscation of probability distributions. More specifically, we prove that every (ε, δ)-DP mechanism provides (ε, δ )-DistP for some δ . In particular, we show that an obfuscation mechanism with δ > 0 (e.g., the Gaussian mechanism) is not useful for distribution obfuscation when the domain size |X | is large. We also prove that every XDP mechanism (e.g., the Laplace mechanism) provides XDistP whose level is proportional to the ∞-Wasserstein distance W ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) between the two distributions λ 0 , λ 1 that we want to make indistinguishable. Finally, we show that every f -divergence privacy mechanism contributes to distribution obfuscation proportionally to the Earth mover's distance W 1,d .
A. Distribution Obfuscation by DP Mechanisms
We first show that every DP mechanism provides DistP. Recall the lifting Φ # of a relation Φ in Definition 9.
This means that after the mechanism A is applied, any pair (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # become indistinguishable up to the threshold ε and with exceptions δ · |Φ|. Intuitively, when two distributions λ 0 and λ 1 are adjacent w.r.t. the relation Φ # , then we can construct λ 1 from λ 0 only by moving some mass from λ 0 [x 0 ] to λ 1 [x 1 ] where (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ Φ (i.e., x 0 is adjacent to x 1 ).
Example 3 (Randomized response). By Theorem 1, the (ε, 0)-DP randomized response [8] and RAPPOR [19] provide (ε, 0)-DistP. This implies that, when an ε-DP mechanism is applied, the estimation of the original distribution is harder for smaller values of ε.
Note that when the domain size |X | is large and all elements of X are adjacent (i.e., Φ = X ×X ), then an obfuscation mechanism with δ > 0 is not useful for distribution obfuscation, because the required noise is proportional to |X | 2 .
B. Distribution Obfuscation by XDP Mechanisms
Next we show that every XDP mechanism A provides XDistP under the ∞-Wasserstein distance W ∞,d .
1) The ∞-Wasserstein distance W ∞,d as Utility Distance: We first observe how much ε is sufficient for an ε -XDP mechanism (e.g., the Laplace mechanism) to make two distribution λ 0 and λ 1 indistinguishable in terms of ε-DistP.
Suppose that λ 0 and λ 1 are point distributions such that λ 0 [x 0 ] = 1 and λ 1 [x 1 ] = 1 for some x 0 , x 1 ∈ X . Then an ε -XDP mechanism A satisfies:
In order for A to provide ε-DistP, ε should be defined as: x1) . That is, the noise added by A should be proportional to the distance d (x 0 , x 1 ) between x 0 and x 1 .
To extend this to an arbitrary distribution, we need to use some utility metric between distributions. A natural possible definition would be the largest distance between values of λ 0 and λ 1 , i.e., the diameter over the supports defined by:
However, when there is an outlier in either λ 0 or λ 1 that is far from most of the values in the domain X , then the value of the diameter tends to be very large. Hence the mechanisms that add noise proportionally to the diameter would lose utility too much, and thus impractical for distribution obfuscation.
To have better utility, we deal with the ∞-Wasserstein metric W ∞,d . The basic idea is that given two distributions λ 0 and λ 1 over X , we consider the cost of a transportation of weights from λ 0 to λ 1 . The transportation is formalized as a coupling γ of λ 0 and λ 1 (see Definition 7) , and the cost of the largest move is represented by:
i.e., the sensitivity w.r.t. the adjacency relation supp(γ) ⊆ X × X (see Definition 5) . Then the minimum cost of the largest move is given by the ∞-Wasserstein metric:
Note that W ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ≤ diam(λ 0 , λ 1 ), hence the noise added proportionally to the ∞-Wasserstein metric is not greater than that to the diameter. This implies that obfuscating a probability distribution requires less noise than obfuscating a set of data. On the other hand, the required noise is still large enough to provide distribution privacy especially when we want to make two distant distributions indistinguishable.
2) XDP implies XDistP: Next we show that every XDP mechanism A provides XDistP under the lifted distance W ∞,d . Intuitively, this means that the perturbation of each output value (by the mechanism A) yields the obfuscation of the output distribution, while the amount of noise should be proportional to the ∞-Wasserstein metric W ∞,d between the distributions that we wish to make indistinguishable.
Theorem 2 ((ε, d , δ)-XDP ⇒ (ε, W ∞,d , δ · |Φ|)-XDistP). Let Φ ⊆ X × X , and A : X → DY be a randomized algorithm. If A provides (ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ, then it provides (ε, W ∞,d , δ · |Φ|)-XDistP w.r.t. Φ # W∞ . By Theorem 2, every ε-XDP mechanism provides (ε, W ∞,d , 0)-DistP, hence, for instance, so do the Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism.
On the other hand, when δ > 0, the noise required for obfuscation is proportional to |Φ|, which is at most the domain size squared |X | 2 . This implies that for a larger domain X , the Gaussian mechanism is not suited for distribution obfuscation, compared to the Laplace mechanism. In Section VII-C we demonstrate this by experiments.
C. Distribution Privacy with the f -Divergence
In this section we present the relationships between fdivergence privacy and D f -distribution privacy.
We use the Earth mover's distance (1-Wasserstein metric) W 1,d as a utility distance for D f -distribution privacy mechanisms. Unlike the ∞-Wasserstein distance W ∞,d for D δ ∞distribution privacy, we consider a transportation γ from a distribution λ 0 to another λ 1 that minimizes the expected cost of the transportation. The expected cost is formalized as the expected sensitivity w.r.t. the adjacency relation supp(γ), and its minimum is given by the Earth mover's distance W 1,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ). Algorithm 2 Tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A Input: x: an input value, k: the number of dummies, ν: a distribution of dummy data, A: a randomized algorithm Output: y: the output value of the tupling mechanism s $ ← A(x) ; // Draw an obfuscated value s of an input x r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k $ ← ν ; // Draw k dummies from a given distribution ν i $ ← {1, 2, . . . , k + 1} ; // Draw an integer j to decide the order of the outputs y := (r 1 , . . . , r i , s, r i+1 , . . . , r k ) ; return y ;
Next we show that every f -divergence privacy mechanism provides D f -distribution privacy.
We also obtain the extended version as follows.
To achieve D f -XDistP, the noise should be added proportionally to the Earth mover's distance W 1,d , whereas to achieve D δ ∞ -XDistP, the noise should be added proportionally to the ∞-Wasserstein distance W ∞,d between input distributions. Since the Earth mover's distance is not grater than the ∞-Wasserstein distance, D f -XDistP can require less noise than D ∞ -XDistP.
VI. DISTRIBUTION OBFUSCATION BY RANDOM DUMMIES
In this section we present an obfuscation mechanism that adds random dummies to the output, and show how these dummies obfuscate the original input distribution (resp. input value) in terms of distribution privacy (resp. differential privacy). Although many studies have been using random dummies to hide users' locations [20] - [22] , they do not aim at protecting users' attributes (e.g., age, gender, work role) or activities (e.g., working, sleeping, shopping) in a differentially private manner. In this section we prove that what we call the "tupling mechanism" provides distribution privacy, hence the privacy of user attributes. See Appendix H for all the proofs.
A. Tupling Mechanism
We first introduce an obfuscation mechanism, called the tupling mechanism, that obfuscates a given input x by using a point obfuscation mechanism A (e.g., DP or XDP mechanism), and that also adds k random dummy data r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k to the output. The algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Definition 19 ((k, ν, A)-tupling mechanism). Let k ∈ N >0 , ν ∈ DY be a distribution of dummy data, and A : X → DY be a randomized algorithm. Then the (k, ν, A)-tupling mechanism is a randomized algorithm Q tp k,ν,A : X → D(Y k+1 ) that, given an input value x ∈ X , 1) computes the output s of A(x), 2) draws k dummies r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k from the distribution ν, 3) randomly picks an integer i from the uniform distribution over {1, 2, . . . , k + 1}, and 4) outputs the tuple (r 1 , . . . , r i , s, r i+1 , . . . , r k ). Note that when i = 0, the output is of the form (s, r 1 , . . . , r k ). The probability that given an input x, the mechanism Q tp k,ν,A outputsȳ is given by Q tp k,ν,A (x)[ȳ]. Intuitively, A is intended to obfuscate the input value x (not necessarily in terms of DP or XDP), while the dummy data generated from ν obfuscate the distribution of the input.
B. Privacy of the Tupling Mechanism
Next we prove that the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A provides (ε, 0)-DistP and (ε α , δ α )-PDistP.
Proposition 3 ((ε, 0)-DistP of the tupling mechanism). Let k ∈ N >0 , and ν be the uniform distribution over Y. Let A : X → DY be a randomized algorithm that provides (ε, 0)-DP w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ. Then the (k, ν, A)-tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A provides (ε, 0)-DistP w.r.t. Φ # . Hereafter, given two distribution λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX and a randomized algorithm A : X → DY, we define β as a real number such that for some η ∈ [0, 1] and for each b = 0, 1,
(See Proposition 13 in Appendix H.) Then we obtain:
Proposition 4 ((ε α , δ α )-PDistP of the tupling mechanism). Let k ∈ N >0 , ν be the uniform distribution over Y, and A : X → DY. For an α ∈ R >0 , let ε α = ln k+(α+β)·|Y| k−α·|Y| and δ α = 2 exp − 2α 2 kβ 2 + η. Then for any 0 < α < k |Y| , the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A provides (ε α , δ α )-PDistP. In Proposition 4, there is no restriction on A, i.e., A does not have to provide DP, in order for the tupling mechanism to provides PDistP. On the other hand, if A spreads the input distribution (e.g., A provides ε-DP for a smaller ε), then β tends to be smaller, hence smaller values of ε α and δ α , as we will see experimental results in Section VII.
By Propositions 4, 2, and Theorem 6, we obtain that the tupling mechanism provides DistP and thus DP.
Theorem 5 (DistP, DP, D KL -DistP, D KL -DP of the tupling mechanism). Let k ∈ N >0 , ν be the uniform distribution over Y, and A : X → DY. Then for any α > 0, the (k, ν, A)tupling mechanism provides:
(1) (ε α , δ α )-DistP, and (2) (ε α , δ α )-DP. Moreover, if A provides (ε, 0)-DP w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ, then the (k, ν, A)-tupling mechanism provides:
This theorem states that just adding random dummies achieves DistP and DP, in particular, a strong level of privacy on average in terms of KL-privacy. In Section VII, we will show by experiments that a small number of random dummies enables us to provide a strong distribution privacy (hence a strong privacy of user attributes) even when ε is large, i.e., when A adds only little noise to the input.
C. Service Quality Loss and Cost of the Tupling Mechanism
When a user locally uses an obfuscation mechanism and obtains an output y closer to the original input x, he obtains a larger utility, or equivalently, a smaller service quality loss d (x, y). For example, in an LBS (location based service), if a user located at x sends an obfuscated location y, then the LBS provider returns the restaurants near y, hence the service quality loss can be expressed as the Euclidean distance between x and y: d (x, y) = x − y .
Since each output of the tupling mechanism consists of k + 1 elements, the quality loss of submitting a tupleȳ = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k+1 ) amounts to the minimum of each element y i 's quality loss: d (x,ȳ) := min i d (x, y i ). Then the expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism is defined as follows.
Definition 20 (Expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism). Given an input distribution λ ∈ DX and a metric d : X × Y → R, we define the expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A by:
This implies that for a larger number k of random dummy data, min i d (x, y i ) is smaller on average, hence the expected quality loss L Q tp k,ν,A is smaller. On the other hand, the traffic cost of applying the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A is larger for a lager number k of dummy data. In Sections VII we show by experiments the trade-offs among the privacy, utility, and cost of the tupling mechanism.
D. Improving the Worst-Case Quality Loss
As a point obfuscation mechanism A used in the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A , we define the restricted Laplace mechanism below. Intuitively, (ε A , r)-restricted Laplace mechanism adds ε A -XDP Laplace noise only within a radius r of the original location x. This ensures that the worst-case quality loss of the tupling mechanisms is bounded above by the radius r, whereas the standard Laplace mechanism reports a location y that is arbitrarily distant from x with a small probability.
Definition 21 (Restricted Laplace mechanism). Let ε A , r ∈ R ≥0 and Y x,r = {y ∈ Y | d (x, y ) ≤ r}. We define (ε A , r)-restricted Laplace mechanism (RL) as the randomized algorithm A : X → DY that, given an input x, outputs y with the probability: Note that the restricted Laplace mechanism A does not provide DP, since its support is limited to Y x,r . Nevertheless, as shown in Theorem 5, the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A provides (ε, δ)-DP, thanks to the random dummies distributed over Y \ Y x,r . Also, if r ≥ max x∈X ,y∈Y d (x, y), (ε A , r)restricted Laplace mechanism behaves similarly to the (ε A , 0)-DP Laplace mechanism, hence Theorem 5 (3) and (4) hold.
VII. APPLICATION TO ATTRIBUTE PRIVACY IN LOCATION BASED SERVICES
In this section we apply obfuscation mechanisms to the protection of the privacy of user attributes in location based services (LBSs), and evaluate it by experiments in the framework of distribution privacy. In an LBS, each user submits his own geo-location x to an LBS provider to obtain some information relevant to x (e.g., a list of restaurants near x). The disclosure of user locations may also allow an attacker to infer about the users' attributes (e.g., ages, genders, residence areas) and activities (e.g., working, sleeping, shopping) [5]- [7] . To mitigate such information leaks, we assume that each user locally applies an obfuscation mechanism Q to his geolocation x to report an obfuscated output y to the LBS provider. In this setting we demonstrate how Q can obfuscate the distribution of actual user locations and make it more difficult to infer their attributes from their reported location y.
A. Experimental Setup
We perform experiments on the location privacy in Manhattan by using the Foursquare dataset (Global-scale Check-in Dataset) [23] . We first divide Manhattan into 11 × 10 regions with 1.0km intervals. To provide more useful information to users located in crowded regions, we further re-divide these regions to 276 regions by recursively partitioning each crowded region into four regions until each resulting region has roughly similar population density. 3 Let Y be the set of those 276 regions, and X be the set the 228 regions inside the central 10km × 9km area in Y. As an obfuscation mechanism Q, we use the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A that uses a RL (restricted Laplace) mechanism A and the uniform distribution ν over Y to generate dummy locations. Note that ν is close to the population density distribution over Y, because Y is constructed so that each region in Y has roughly similar population density. In the definitions of the RL mechanism and the quality loss, we use the Euclidean distance · between the central points of the regions over the two-dimensional Euclidean plane.
In the experiments, we measure the privacy of user attributes, which is formalized as distribution privacy in Section III. Recall the running example of protecting whether users are male or female in Section III-A. For each attribute t ∈ {male, female}, let λ t ∈ DX be the prior distribution of the location of the users who have the attribute t. Intuitively, λ male (resp. λ female ) represent an attacker's belief on the location of the male (resp. female) users. Thus we define these as the empirical distributions that the attacker can calculate from the Foursquare dataset mentioned above.
In addition, we deal with an attribute on the residence area: the users living in the northern Manhattan (north) and those living in the southern Manhattan (south). Then λ north (resp. λ south ) represents the distribution of check-in locations of the users living in the northern (resp. southern) Manhattan. We show the plot of these distributions in Fig. 4 .
B. Evaluation of the Tupling Mechanism
Now we empirically evaluate the distribution privacy and expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A : X → DY k+1 when ν is the uniform distribution over Y and A : X → DY is (ε A , r)-RL (restricted Laplace) mechanism.
1) Distribution privacy: We demonstrate by experiments that the male users cannot be recognized as which of male or female in terms of distribution privacy. In Fig. 5 , we show the experimental results on the distribution privacy of the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A . For a larger number k of dummy locations, we have a stronger distribution privacy (Fig. 5a ). For a larger ε A , (ε A , 0.020)-RL mechanism A adds less noise, hence the tupling mechanism provides a weaker distribution privacy 4 (Fig. 5b) . For a larger radius r, the RL mechanism A spreads the original distribution λ male and thus provides a strong distribution privacy (Fig. 5c) .
These results imply that if we increase the number k of dummies, then we can decrease the noise level/radius of the RL mechanism A, while keeping to provide ε-DistP. (c) Relationship between ε-DistP and the radius r of (100, r)-RL mechanism (when adding k = 10 dummies). Expected loss ε A of restricted Laplace noise radius = 0.040 radius = 0.030 radius = 0.020 radius = 0.010 (d) Relationship between the expected quality loss and the degree εA of (εA, r)-RL mechanism A for r = 0.010, 0.020, 0.030, 0.040 and for k = 5 dummies. Fig. 5 : Empirical results on the distribution privacy of the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A for the attribute male/female. (c) Relationship between ε-DistP and the radius r of (100, r)-RL mechanism (when adding k = 10 dummies). Expected loss ε A of restricted Laplace noise radius = 0.040 radius = 0.030 radius = 0.020 radius = 0.010 (d) Relationship between the expected quality loss and the degree εA of (εA, r)-RL mechanism A for r = 0.010, 0.020, 0.030, 0.040 and for k = 5 dummies. Fig. 6 : Empirical results on the distribution privacy of the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A for the attribute north/south.
Conversely, if the RL mechanism A adds more noise, then we can decrease the number k of dummies. Compared to the attribute of male/female (Fig. 5 ), the attribute of residence areas (Fig. 6 ) requires more noise for distribution obfuscation. This is because the distance of λ north and λ south is larger than that of λ male and λ female .
In Table IV , we show the theoretical values of ε calculated by Proposition 4 for δ = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 and for D KL -DistP. Compared to the experimental results, those theoretical values can only give loose upper bounds on ε. This is because the concentration inequality used to derive Proposition 4 give loose bounds. Improving those bounds is left for future work.
2) Expected quality loss: In Fig. 5d , we show the experimental results on the expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism. For a larger ε A , the RL mechanism A adds less noise, hence the expected quality loss is smaller.
We confirm that for more dummy data, the expected quality loss is smaller. Unlike the standard planar Laplace mechanism (PL), the RL mechanism ensures that the worst quality loss is bounded above by the radius r. Furthermore, for a smaller radius r, the expected loss is also smaller as shown in Fig. 5d .
In addition, when the radius r is small, the output of the RL mechanism is outside the domain (i.e., Manhattan) with a far smaller probability than the standard mechanism PL. Hence if Y is large enough, then the RL mechanism does not require additional computation (e.g. remapping technique [24] ) to handle the output outside the domain.
3) Computational cost:
We briefly discuss the computational cost of the tupling mechanism Q tp k,ν,A , compared to the standard planar Laplace mechanism PL.
In the implementation, for a larger domain X , PL deals with a larger size |X | × |Y| of the mechanism's matrix, since it outputs each region with a non-zero probability. In contrast, since the RL mechanism A in Q tp k,ν,A maps each location x to a region within a radius r of x, the size of A's matrix can be |X | × |Y x,r |, which is much smaller than that of PL.
Furthermore, the users of the tupling mechanism can simply ignore the responses to dummy queries, whereas the users of PL need to select relevant POIs (point of interests) from a large radius of x, which could cost computationally when there are a large number of POIs. Therefore, the tupling mechanism is more suited to be used in mobile environments than PL. Fig. 7 : Comparison of the randomized response (RR), the planar Laplace mechanism (PL), the planar Gaussian mechanism (PG), and the tupling mechanism (TM) Q tp k,ν,A with k = 10 dummies and a radius r = 0.020. The experiments are performed for the location data of the attribute male/female.
C. Comparison of Obfuscation Mechanisms
We demonstrate that the tupling mechanism (TM) outperforms the popular obfuscation mechanisms: the randomized response (RR), the planar Laplace mechanism (PL), and the planar Gaussian mechanism (PG). In Fig. 7 we compare these mechanisms concerning the relationship between the ε-DistP and the expected quality loss. For both (ε, δ)-DistP ( Fig. 7a) and (ε, D KL )-DistP (Fig. 7b) , the expected quality loss of the tupling mechanism is smaller than those of the other mechanisms. As expected by Theorem 2, PG provides a weaker distribution privacy than PL for the same quality loss. We also confirm that PL has smaller loss than RR, since it adds noise proportionally to the distance.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy. Since the seminal work of Dwork [1] on differential privacy, a number of its variants have been studied to provide different types of privacy guarantees; e.g., f -divergence privacy [18] , [25] , d-privacy [12] , mutualinformation differential privacy [26] , Rényi differential privacy [17] , Pufferfish privacy [27] , Bayesian differential privacy [28] , local differential privacy [29] , personalized differential privacy [30] , heterogeneous differential privacy [31] , and restricted local differential privacy [32] . All of these are intended to protect the input data of a randomized algorithm A from an attacker who observes the output of A. To our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the privacy of probability distributions that lies behind the input.
Some studies are technically related to our work. Song et al. [33] propose the Wasserstein mechanism to provide Pufferfish privacy, which protects correlated input data. Wang et al. [34] show that releasing a single sample from the posterior distribution in Bayesian learning is an instance of the exponential mechanism, and therefore provides differential privacy. Subsequently, Liu et al. [35] provide a differentiallyprivate matrix factorization algorithm via Bayesian posterior sampling. Sei et al. [36] propose a variant of the randomized response called the S2M protocol to protect individual data and provide high utility of database. Barthe and Olmedo [25] introduce the notion of α-distance to characterize ( , δ)-differential privacy as an instance of the f -divergence.
However, we emphasize again that our work differs from these studies in that we aim at protecting probability distributions of inputs. We have introduced the notion of distribution privacy, and used it to model the privacy of user attributes.
Location privacy. Location privacy has been widely studied in the literature, and its survey can be found in [37] - [39] . A number of location obfuscation methods have been proposed so far, and they can be roughly divided into the following four types: perturbation (adding noise) [3] , [4] , [40] , location generalization (merging regions) [41] - [43] , and location hiding (deleting) [42] , [44] , [45] , and adding dummy locations [20] - [22] . Location obfuscation based on differential privacy (or its variant) have also been widely studied, and they can be categorized into the ones in the centralized model [46] - [48] and the ones in the local model [3] , [4] . However, these methods aim at protecting locations, and neither at protecting users' attributes (e.g., age, gender, work role) nor activities (e.g., working, sleeping, shopping) in a differentially private manner. Despite the fact that users' attributes and activities can be inferred from their locations [5] - [7] , to our knowledge, no studies have proposed obfuscation mechanisms to provide rigorous privacy guarantee for such attributes and activities.
Therefore, we proposed a notion of DistP and obfuscation mechanisms based on perturbation and dummy locations to protect users' attributes or activities, which lie behind the locations, in a differentially private manner.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a formal model for the privacy of user attributes in terms of differential privacy. In particular, we have introduced the notion of distribution privacy as the differential privacy for probability distributions. We have investigated obfuscation mechanisms that can provide distribution privacy. In particular, we have shown how much distribution privacy can be guaranteed by the DP mechanisms, the XDP mechanisms, and the tupling mechanism. Then we have applied the tupling mechanism to the protection of users attributes in location based services, and demonstrated by experiments that the tupling mechanism outperforms the existing DP and XDP mechanisms in terms of distribution privacy and utility.
As future work we will improve the theoretical bounds on ε for the tupling mechanism. We are also planning to design optimal mechanisms that minimize the quality loss and traffic/computational costs, while providing distribution privacy, in various applications. Furthermore, we will develop obfuscation mechanisms that can provide distribution privacy in the presence of correlated inputs.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume A provides (ε, δ)-DP w.r.t. Φ. Let δ = δ · |Φ|, and (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # . By Definition 9, there is a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ 0 , λ 1 ) satisfying supp(γ) ⊆ Φ. By Definition 7, we have:
for each
Then we calculate the ratio of the probability that A # outputs an element of R given input λ 0 to that given input λ 1 :
(by (1), (2))
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that A provides (ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ. Let (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # W∞ . By Definition 10, there exists a coupling γ ∈ cp(λ 0 , λ 1 ) that satisfies supp(γ) ⊆ Φ and γ ∈ Γ ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ). Then γ minimizes the sensitivity ∆ supp(γ) ; i.e., γ ∈ argmin γ ∈cp(λ0,λ1)
In the same way as the proof for Theorem 1, it follows from supp(γ) ⊆ Φ and (ε, d , δ)-XDP w.r.t. Φ that:
2) D f -Distribution Privacy: We next show the proofs for the D f -distribution privacy results.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let A : X → DY be a randomized algorithm. For any λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX and Γ def = cp(λ 0 , λ 1 ),
(by Jensen's inequality and the convexity of f )
Assume that A provides (ε, D f )-DP w.r.t. Φ. Let (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # . By Definition 9, there exists a coupling γ ∈ Γ that satisfies supp(γ) ⊆ Φ. Then we obtain:
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is analogous to those of Theorems 2 and 3.
B. Point Obfuscation by Distribution Obfuscation
Next we show that DP is an instance of DistP.
Definition 22 (Point distribution). For each x ∈ X , the point distribution η x of x is the distribution over X such that:
x ] = 1 if x = x 0 and x = x 1 , and γ[x, x ] = 0 otherwise. Then γ is the only coupling between η x0 and η x1 , hence γ ∈ Γ p,d (η x0 , η x1 ). Also supp(γ) = {(x 0 , x 1 )} ⊆ Φ. Therefore by Definition 10, we obtain (η x0 , η x1 ) ∈ Φ # Wp .
Theorem 6 (DistP ⇒ DP and XDistP ⇒ XDP). Let ε ∈ R ≥0 , p ∈ R ≥1 ∪ {∞}, D ∈ Div(Y), Φ ⊆ X × X , and A : X → DY be a randomized algorithm.
Proof. We prove the first claim as follows. Assume that A provides (ε, D)-DistP w.r.t. Φ # . Let (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ Φ, and η x0 and η x1 be the point distributions, defined in Definition 22. By Lemma 1 and Φ # Wp ⊆ Φ # , we have (η x0 , η x1 ) ∈ Φ # . By (ε, D)-DistP, we obtain:
The second claim can be shown analogously.
C. Sequential Compositions and •
In this section we show two kinds of compositionality. 1) Sequential Composition with Shared Input: We first recall the standard definition of the sequential composition (Figure 2a ) in the previous work of differential privacy.
Definition 23 (Sequential composition ). Given two randomized algorithms A 0 : X → DY 0 and A 1 : Y 0 × X → DY 1 , we define the sequential composition of A 0 and A 1 as the randomized algorithm A 1 A 0 : X → DY 1 such that: for any
Then we show that it is hard to obfuscate distributions when an identical input is applied to the mechanism multiple times.
Proof. By Theorem 6, A 0 provides (ε 0 , D δ0 ∞ )-DP w.r.t. Φ, and for each y 0 ∈ Y 0 , A 1 (y 0 ) provides (ε 1 , D δ1 ∞ )-DP w.r.t. Φ. By the sequential composition theorem for DP mechanisms,
The other compositionality results are shown in Table III and their proofs are analogous to that of Proposition 5.
2) Sequential Composition • with Independent Sampling: We first note that the lifting of the sequential composition (A 1 A 0 ) # does not coincide with the sequential composition of the liftings A 1 # A 1 # . Then the latter is a randomized algorithm A 1
Then each of A 0 and A 1 receives an input independently sampled from λ. This is different from A 1 A 0 , in which A 0 and A 1 share an identical input drawn from λ, as shown in Figure 2a .
To see this difference in detail, we deal with another definition of sequential composition.
Definition 24 (Sequential composition •). Given two randomized algorithms A 0 : X → DY 0 and A 1 : Y 0 × X → DY 1 , we define the sequential composition of A 0 and A 1 as the randomized algorithm A 1 • A 0 : X × X → DY 1 such that: for any x 0 , x 1 ∈ X , (A 1 • A 0 )(x 0 , x 1 ) = A 1 (A 0 (x 0 ), x 1 )).
Then the lifting of the sequential composition (A 1 • A 0 ) # coincides with the sequential composition of the liftings A 1 # • A 1 # in the sense that for any λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX ,
where λ 0 × λ 1 is the probability distribution over X × X such that for all x 0 ,
The compositionality results are shown in Table III and their proofs are straightforward from the definition.
Note that the comparison of the compositions with shared input and with independent input is also discussed from the viewpoint of quantitative information flow in [49] .
D. Post-processing and Pre-processing
Next we show that distribution privacy is immune to the post-processing. For A 0 : X → DY and A 1 :
Proof. The claim for D = D f is immediate from the data processing inequality for the f -divergence.
Below we show the case of D = D δ ∞ . Let (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Ψ . Since every randomized algorithm is a convex combination of deterministic algorithms, there are a distribution µ over an index set I and deterministic algorithms A 1,i : U i → R such that A 1 = i∈I µ[i]A 1,i . Then we obtain:
Then we show the first claim as follows. Assume that A 0
Therefore A 1 • A 0 provides (ε, D δ ∞ )-DistP. The second claim can be shown analogously.
We then show a property on pre-processing.
Proposition 7 (Pre-processing). Let c ∈ R ≥0 , W : DX × DX → R ≥0 be a metric, and D ∈ Div(Y).
1) If T : DX → DX is a c-stable transformation and A :
Proof. We show the first claim as follows. Assume that A provides (ε, D)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ . Let λ, λ ∈ DX . Then we have:
The second claim can be shown analogously. Therefore A provides (ε, δ)-DistP w.r.t. Ψ .
E. Relationships between

F. Relationships between PDistP and KL-DistP
In this section we present a proof for Proposition 2. To show this, we prove its corresponding claim for point privacy. 
G. Relationships among XDistP Notions
In this section we show relationships among distribution privacy notions with different metric d and divergence D. Proof. Assume that A provides (ε, W 1,d , D)-XDistP. Let λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX . By the property of the p-Wasserstein metric, W 1,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ≤ W ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ). Then D(µ 0 µ 1 ) ≤ W 1,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ≤ W ∞,d (λ 0 , λ 1 ). Hence the claim follows. Proof. Assume A provides (ε, d, D )-XDistP. Let λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX . Then D (A # (λ 0 ) A # (λ 1 )) ≤ εd(λ 0 , λ 1 ). By definition, D(A # (λ 0 ) A # (λ 1 )) ≤ D (A # (λ 0 ) A # (λ 1 )) ≤ εd(λ 0 , λ 1 ). Thus A provides (ε, d, D)-XDistP.
H. Properties of the Tupling Mechanism
In this section we show properties of the tupling mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let Φ ⊆ X × X . Since A provides (ε, 0)-DP w.r.t. Φ, Theorem 1 implies that A provides (ε, 0)-DistP w.r.t. Φ # .
Let (λ 0 , λ 1 ) ∈ Φ # and R ⊆ Y k+1 such that Q tp k,ν,A (λ 0 )[R] > 0 and Q tp k,ν,A (λ 1 )[R] > 0. Letȳ = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k+1 ) ∈ R be an output of Q tp k,ν,A . Since i is uniformly drawn from {1, 2, . . . , k + 1} in the mechanism Q tp k,ν,A , the output of A appears as the i-th element y i of the tupleȳ with probability 1 k+1 . For each b = 0, 1, when an input x is drawn from λ b , the probability that A outputs y i is:
On the other hand, for each j = i, the probability that y j is drawn from ν is given by ν[y j ]. Therefore, the probability that the mechanism Q tp k,ν,A outputs the tupleȳ is:
Hence we obtain:
Therefore Q tp k,ν,A provides (ε, 0)-DistP w.r.t. Φ # .
Proof of Proposition 4. Let λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ DX , and R ⊆ Y k+1 such that Q tp k,ν,A (λ 0 )[R] > 0 and Q tp k,ν,A (λ 1 )[R] > 0. As in the proof for Proposition 3, for anyȳ = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k+1 ) ∈ R:
Recall that in the definition of the tupling mechanism, y i is the output of A while for each j = i, y j is generated from the uniform distribution ν over Y. Hence the expected value of j =i A # (λ 0 )[y j ] is given by k |Y| . Therefore it follows from the Hoeffding's inequality that for any α > 0, we have:
where each y j is independently drawn from ν, hence each of A # (λ 0 )[y j ] and A # (λ 1 )[y j ] is independent. By δ α = 2 exp − 2α 2 kβ 2 , we obtain:
Whenȳ is drawn from Q tp k,ν,A (λ 0 ), let y i be the output of A # (λ 0 ). Then we obtain: 
(by (7)) Then there is an R ⊆ Y k+1 such that Q tp k,ν,A (λ 0 )[R ] ≤ δ α , and that for anyȳ ∈ R,ȳ ∈ R iff 
